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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19103

-v-

LOUIS SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
defendant's perception regarding the power of his parole officer
and the effect of incarceration on his health, as it related to
defendant's mens rea at the time he pawned the stolen property.
If the trial judge erroneously excluded evidence,
whether that exclusion constituted reversible error.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Richard Louis Smith, was charged with Theft,
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-408 (1953), as amended and Theft by

Deception, a Class A misdemeanor in violation of

Utah Code Ann.

76-6-405 (1953), as amended.

Defendant was convicted of Theft by Receiving and Theft
by Deception, in a jury trial held February 14 and 15, 1983, in

the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Baldwin on March 4,
1983, to the Utah State Prison for the indefinite term of 1-15

years on the charge of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property and one
year on the charge of Theft by Deception, the sentences to run
concurrently.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 7, 1982, the residence of Steven Page
was burglarized CT. 9-10).
rifles CT. 7, 10).

Among the items stolen were two

On the same day, defendant pawned one rifle

at Pawnee Loans and a second rifle at Sportsman's Discount CT.
15-17, 56-58, 103).

Defendant misrepresented ownership of the

rifles at both places CT. 26-27, 59).

The rifles defendant

pawned were later identified as the same rifles taken from the
residence of Steven Page CT. 7-8, 15-16, 56-57).
Ron Peterson, defendant's nephew, who had admitted
involvement in the burglary, testified that defendant had taken
the guns (February 15, T. 10-lll.

Defendant told detective Paul

Lamont that he knew the guns were stolen at the time he

had

pawned them, but denied involvement in the burglary CT. 74-75).
At trial, defendant testified that he did not know the
guns were stolen CT. 118-119).

The defense attempted to present

evidence as to defendant's perception of the power of his parole
officer CT. 109-110).
CT. 110).

The State objected on relevancy grounds

The Court sustained the objection as to defendant's

beliefs CT. 110).

The trial judge also stated that the objection

would be sustained regarding the powers of the parole officer on
grounds that no foundation had been laid CT. 110).

The defense

also tried to present evidence as to the effect of jail on
defendant's health (T. 111).

The State objected on relevancy

grounds and the court sustained (T. 111).
-2-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The evidence excluded by the trial judge was irrelevant
in determining the state of mind of defendant at the time he
pawned the stolen property.

If admitted the evidence would have

confused the issues and misled the jury.
If the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence, it
was harmless error.

Defendant was allowed to testify regarding

his state of mind at 1fe time he pawned the rifles.

Defendant

admitted to a police officer that he knew the guns were stolen
when he pawned them and his nephew testified that defendant had
taken the guns.

Therefore, if the evidence was erroneously

excluded, its admission would not have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE
POWER OF HIS PAROLE OFFICER AND THE EFFECT
OF INCARCERATION ON HIS HEALTH.
Defendant argues that the trial judge improperly
excluded evidence under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 401-402
(Supp. 1983) and that such exclusion constituted reversible
error.

The excluded evidence consisted of defendant's belief as

to the power of his parole officer to put him in jail and the
effect incarceration had had on defendant's health.

The trial

court, however, properly excluded the evidence based upon its
determination that the evidence was irrelevant.
When reviewing admissibility of evidence issues on
d[>peal,

the trial court's decision will only be overturned if
-3-

there has been a substantial abuse of discretion.

The United

States Supreme Court has stated that appellate courts should
"leave rulings as to the illuminating relevance of testimony
largely to the discretion of the trial court that hears the
evidence."

Hamling y. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125 (1973).
The excluded evidence was irrelevant because it was not

probative to the issue of mens rea required under the statute.
Whether defendant kneW or probably should have known that the
rifles were stolen had no relation whatsoever to his perceptions
of the power of his parole officer or to the effect of
incarceration on his health.

Defendant was allowed to testify as

to his conduct and state of mind at the time he pawned the
rifles, therefore the mens rea issue was properly placed before
the jury.
This Court recently held that when specific intent is
an element of the crime charged, evidence should be admitted
which would tend to disprove the existence of a specific intent.
State y. Miller, Utah, 677 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1984).

However,

involved a conspiracy charge and dealt with the exclusion
of expert testimony relating to the state of mind of defendant at
the time he engaged in the alleged crime.

The present case

involves perceptions of defendant as to the powers of his parole
officer and the effect of incarceration on his health which are
unrelated to his state of mind at the time he pawned the stolen
property.

The excluded evidence would not in any way "tend to

disprove the existence of a specific intent."
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POINT II
IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THE TRIAL JUDGE
ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE, THE
ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
When considering the effect of error, this court has
applied the following standard of review:
We do not upset the verdict of jury merely
because some error or irregularity may have
occurred, but will do so only if it is
something substantial and prejudicial in
the sense tl'\at there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there
would have been a different result.
state y. Kozik, Utah, 688 P.2d 459, 461 (1984).
Defendant's contention that the exclusion of evidence
by

the trial judge constituted reversible error is without merit.

Defendant attempted to introduce evidence which would have had
the effect of confusing the issues and misleading the jury.

The

trial judge is allowed wide discretion in excluding otherwise
relevant evidence according to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(August 1983) which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
(emphasis added)
The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in
excluding evidence which would not have aided the jury and which
>'as, at best, remotely relevant.

Defendant's perception of the

rnwers of his parole officer and the effect of incarceration on
health was irrelevant in determining defendant's state of
-5-

mind at the time he pawned the stolen property.

This court has

held that intent required to support a conviction for theft can
be inferred by defendant's conduct and the testimony of
witnesses.

State v. Jolley, Utah, 571 P.2d 582, 585

(1977l.

Defendant's admission to detective Paul Lamont that he knew the
rifles were stolen when he pawned them and the testimony by
defendant's nephew that defendant had taken the guns demonstrated
that defendant had the requisite mens rea to support the
convictions under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 and 76-6-405.
In a case involving erroneous exclusion of evidence,
this Court recently applied Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence

(July

1971) and held that erroneous exclusion of evidence is not
grounds for reversal unless it appears that the excluded evidence
would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about
a different verdict.

Hill y. Hartog, Utah, 658 P.2d 1206

(1983).

The excluded evidence regarding unrelated perceptions of the
defendant,

if admissible, would not have had a substantial

influence in bringing about a different verdict.

Defendant was

allowed to testify as to his conduct and state of mind at the
time he pawned the rifles, therefore sufficient evidence was
presented to place the issue of mens rea before the jury.
If the trial judge committed error in excluding
evidence, it was certainly not significant enough to warrant a
reversal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,

the trial judge properly

excluded the evidence on relevancy grounds.
determined relevant,

If the evidence is

its erroneous exclusion was harmless error.
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DATED this

day of February, 1985.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact
copies of the foregoirlg Brief, postage prepaid, to Manny Garcia,
attorney for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333
South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

-7-

